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Based on quantitative and qualitative data, this paper 
attempts to identify the main reasons why cargo dwell 
time in Durban port has dramatically reduced in the past 
decade to a current average of 3–4 days. A major customs 
reform; changes in port storage tariffs coupled with 
strict enforcement; massive investments in infrastructure 
and equipment; and changing customer behavior 
through contractualization between the port operator 
and shipping lines or between customs, importers, and 
This paper is a product of the Africa Region, Transport Unit. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide 
open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research 
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at graballand@
worldbank.org.  
brokers have all played a major role. The main lesson 
for Sub-Saharan Africa that can be drawn from Durban 
is that cargo dwell time is mainly a function of the 
characteristics of the private sector, but it is the onus 
of public sector players, such as customs and the port 
authority, to put pressure on the private sector to make 
more efficient use of the port and reduce cargo dwell 
time.  
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There is increasing evidence that transport time decreases trade and increases logistics costs, 
notably because of increased inventories. Hummels (2001) demonstrated empirically that increased 
transport time dramatically reduces trade.  That probably explains why the location of exporters is 
increasingly important and why Kwazulu-Natal, the province where Durban is located, contributes to 
22% of South Africa’s manufacturing gross domestic product with manufacturing activities principally 
located in the Greater Durban Metropolitan Area (Valodia, 2006 and Krugell et al. 2009). Among twelve 
major impediments, the automotive industry in South Africa listed reducing inventories as the most 
important objective (Barloworld 2010). Without reduced cargo dwell time and increasing dwell time 
predictability, the objective of reducing inventories is not likely to be met. 
Ports and cargo dwell time in ports are critical. Arvis et al. 2010 demonstrates that for land 
transport to landlocked countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) over 50% of total transport time from port 
to hinterland cities is spent in ports. 
South Africa has the largest number of intra-regional maritime connections with international 
carriers providing direct access to 29 other African countries (UNCTAD 2009). With the rise in maritime 
traffic volumes, at their peak, South African ports handled up to 185 million tonnes in 2008 before 
experiencing a slight drop in 2009/2010 because of the fallout from the global financial crisis. The 
demand at South African ports surpasses all countries in Eastern and Southern Africa (see Annex 1). 
With a network of eight ports, the country has a critical role to play in the international trade landscape 
for the region. 
Widely acknowledged for relatively good performance compared to others in the region, South 
Africa and its network of ports is ranked 28th in the Logistics Performance Indicator (LPI) for 2010 
followed by Senegal at 58th. The global trend of rising popularity of the container means African ports 
also experienced growth in the containerized cargo market. South Africa handled the highest container 
volumes reaching a peak of 3.9 million TEU’s in 2008 with the Port of Durban
2  accounting for over 60% 
                                                           
2 In South Africa, all ports, freight rail and pipeline infrastructure are owned by the Transnet Group (and all its 
subsidiaries).  The  South  African  government  is  the  unique  shareholder  through  the  Department  of  Public 
Enterprise (DPE) which controls all parastatals. TNPA is the landlord port authority responsible for all the 8 national 
ports in the country providing port infrastructure and marine services as well as tariff setting and control of spatial 
allocation. Port operations are largely run by Transnet Port Terminals (TPT) with some small degree of private 
sector participation. The operations can be divided into 4 sectors namely bulk, break – bulk, automotive and 4 
 
of the traffic. Table 1 below shows data for the period from 2005 - 2009 for container ports in the 
region, highlighting Durban’s dominance in the container market. 
 
Table 1: Port Container Traffic - Eastern and Southern Africa (000 TEU’s)
3 
Port  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Durban  1 899.0  2 334.9  2 479.2  2 642.1  2 395.0 
Cape Town  690.8  764.7  764.0  767.5  694.5 
Mombasa  436.7  479.4  585.4  615.7  618.8 
Port Elizabeth  369.7  497.2  422.8  423.8  441.4 
Dar-es Salaam  258.4  272.7  334.0  373.5  473.7 
Walvis Bay  71.4  83.2  144.9  170.5  Data 
not avail  Maputo  54.0  62.5  80.3  92.2  107.0 
East London  49.3  41.8  41.9  57.4  52.5 
Sources: (TPT, MCLI, TNPA, OSC) 
 
The critical location of Durban on the North  South Freight Corridor, an important route for 
transit traffic bound for Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi and a connection going as far north as Dar es -
Salaam, puts it on the spot light and its performance is extremely vital for countries along the corridor. 
The Durban Container Terminal (DCT) has benefitted substantially from major infrastructure 
investments and it now comprises a new terminal known as Pier 1 and the old terminal known as Pier 2. 
With a capacity of 720,000 TEU’s, Pier 1 has 3 berths with a 11,9m draft, 6 ship to shore gantries with 
888 reefer points. The terminal operates RTG’s. The larger old terminal, Pier 2 is currently designed for a 
capacity of 2,9 million TEU’s and it boasts 6 berths over 14,000 ground slots with an average draft of 
11,8m, 19 ship to shore gantries, 1117 reefer points. The terminal operates with straddle carriers’
4.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
containers. The National Port Authority Act includes clauses to terminate the control of nationalized ports, but the 
implementation is still not on the political agenda and it also face resistance from Transnet management and the 
DPE. 
3 The port of Nqura has been excluded from the list as it mainly handles transshipments and started operations 
late 2009. Transhipments at the port make up approximately 60% of total traffic. In comparison with Durban, 
volumes at Nqura are significantly low. 
4 The port operates 24hrs a day 365 days a year. During day light the ships are restricted to 243.8m length with a 
maximum width of 35m and a draught of 11.9m or 12.2m according to tide and harbor master service. The largest 
ship calling the in 2009 had a 6.742 TEU carrying capacity which is relatively small by world standards but probably 
the largest to call at any African port. See Annex 3 for port and container terminal layout and Annex 4 for berth 
data. 5 
 
Total TEU’s handled across quay in 2010 for both piers was 2,5 million, still below the 2008 peak 
of 2,6 million. 
Most of the containers going through Durban are destined for Johannesburg and transported by 
road while traffic volumes on rail have remained static over the years. A review study of the Durban 
Inland Intermodal Terminal and Logistics Hub conducted in 2008 reveals the turnaround time within the 
port area was too long and had major implications on efficiency thus dwell time (Arup, 2008). 
Even though, from interviews, port performance usually emerges as the main culprit for long 
delays along transit corridors, disentangling port inefficiency is scarcely carried out, especially in Sub-
Saharan Africa. However, in a country with relatively higher trade value, such as South Africa, this is of 
even more importance. 
Therefore, this study seeks to identify what has been done at the Port of Durban in the last 
decade  in  Durban  in  the  effort  to  reduce  cargo  dwell  time  within  the  last  decade.  It  will  also 
demonstrate the impact of reduced cargo dwell time on port operational capacity. This paper especially 
describes the of public sector actors, such as Customs, the port authority and the port operator. 
The paper is based on interviews and data collected from a field visit to Durban carried out in 
January  2011.  During  the  mission,  extensive  consultations  with  port  stakeholders  involving  port 
authorities,  shipping  lines,  freight  forwarders,  customs  brokers  and  various  cargo  owners  were 
undertaken. Data on dwell time was also obtained from a number of sources including Transnet Port 
Terminal (TPT) and the private sector port community
5. 
The main lessons for Sub-Saharan Africa, which can be drawn from Durban port, are that cargo 
dwell time is mainly a function of the characteristics of the private sector, but the onus is on public 
sector players such as customs, the port authorit y, etc. to put pressure  to change the behavior of the 
private sector port users to better comply and reduce cargo dwell time. In this regard, prohibitive 
charges for storage, coupled with strict enforcement, and the possibility to pre-clear with Customs with 
advantages attached to it and service level agreements binding both parties are critical tools  for the 
reduction of cargo dwell time 
The outline of the paper is as follows: section two presents descriptive data on cargo dwell time 
in Durban and compares it to several ports in Sub-Saharan Africa and decomposes the aggregate cargo 
dwell time figure. Section three presents the technical measures, such as cargo storage fees changes, 
                                                           
5 Because of lack of detailed data and the limited share of transit traffic in the total traffic, the paper focuses on 
domestic cargo. 6 
 
which have contributed to decreasing cargo dwell time as well as the role of public stakeholders, mainly 
Customs, the port authority and the port operator. Section four explains the justification of reducing 
cargo dwell time from an operational approach. Then, the main lessons for SSA ports are presented. In 
the sixth section two of the main remaining challenges to reduce cargo dwell time are discussed. The 
final  section  concludes  and  presents  some  factors,  which  could  contribute  to  improve  port 
competitiveness in general. 
2. Cargo Dwell Time at the Port of Durban 
 
“Normal” cargo dwell time differs between ports and even more importantly between port 
users  and  stakeholders
6.  In the case of Durban, 28 days is the time limit for Customs to consider 
“abandoned  cargo” and  this  then  represents the end  of “normal” cargo  dwell  time.  Shippers,  who 
represent the automotive industry, consider 3 days already as excessive dwell time. However, some 
small shippers would tend to consider “normal” cargo dwell time around 4-5 days. 
In  the  absence  of  an  irrefutable  and  uncontested  benchmark  of  what  is  considered  to  be 
abnormal cargo dwell time, TNPA/TPT decided to target a dwell time of 3 days for the Port of Durban. In 
reality, it seems as if this target has been achieved. Data obtained for the Durban Container Terminal 
(DCT)/ Pier 2 (and confirmed by shippers and shipping lines), indicate a 3-4 days dwell time for that 
terminal since 2006.  
The figure below shows that the average dwell time at the port is below 4 days for both imports 
and exports with a slight peak of 5 – 7 days around May 2010 which correlates with the 2010 Transnet 
labor strike period.  
 
                                                           
6 See Refas and Cantens (2011) for a discussion on various definitions. 7 
 
Figure 1: Durban Dwell Time (2006-2010) at DCT Pier 2 
 
Source: Transnet Port Terminal 
 
Dwell time for transshipments is around 5 to 10 days with a few irregular peaks at around the 15 
days mark, notably between July and September
7. This is also related to the fact that  “free time”
8 for 
transshipment is set at 7 days (with low charges below 15 days)
9. 
It should be noted that cargo is generally moved from the terminal to  bonded warehouses 
before the  expiry  of the free storage period   of 3 days  offered by  TPT.  Therefore, the information 
provided does not capture all dwell time figures for the port. Additional data were also collected from 
those involved in cargo handling for the period from January to December 2010. The data are based on 
accounting information from arrival at port to the time cargo is passed on to the owner. The data shows 
that on average most cargo is held for less than 4 days (referred to as overstays). 
According to the main shipping lines/warehouse owners, less than 10% of containers go beyond 
the 3 day period and less than 1%  go beyond  28 days. Based on these multiple interviews, it was 
possible to reconstruct dwell time frequency (see Figure 2). 
                                                           
7 Transshipments account for approximately 20% of total cargo. 
8 Free time is defined as the time from when the vessel completes discharge and the container is stored in the port 
area until collection for a specified period without incurring any port storage charges. For import containers this is 
set at 3 days and 7 days for transshipments. 
9 Figure 1 suggests that dwell time for exports and imports is rather similar and could tend to demonstrate that the 

































































































































































































































Figure 2:   Durban Cargo Dwell Time Frequency 
 
Source: Interviews with TPT and with major shipping lines and warehouses operators. 
 
Therefore,  Durban  appears  to  be  a  good  benchmark  for  Southern  Africa,  but  even  more 
importantly, for SSA ports. Durban is, indeed, by far the port where cargo dwell time is the lowest in 
Southern  Africa  and  SSA  in  general  (see  Table  2  which  presents  data  collected  for  the  Africa 
Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD) for Southern Africa and Table 3 for selected ports in SSA).   
Table 2: Dwell time in Southern Africa 
   Cape 
Town 






Luanda  Beira  Maputo 
South Africa  Namibia  Angola  Mozambique 
Container dwell 
time—average 
(days)  6  4  7  6  8  12  20  22 


















Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4-8 Day 8-28 Over 289 
 
Table 3: Dwell time in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Durban  Douala  Lome  Tema  Mombasa 
Dar-es-
Salaam  Average 
(Durban 
excluded)  South 
Africa 
Cameroon  Togo  Ghana  Kenya  Tanzania 
4  19  18  20  9  19  17 
Source: Refas et al (2011) for Douala, surveys for the other ports. 
When cargo dwell time is broken down between operational, transactional and discretionary 
storage
10, it appears that Durban favorably compares with Mombasa and even more so  with Dar-es-
Salaam
11.  The most significant difference concerns clearance procedures , where up to 6 days can be 
gained, as well as for discretionary storage. The last factor seems to play a major role and is therefore 
discussed in detail below. 
                                                           
10  Operational  dwell  time  is  mainly  the  time  to  unload  vessels  and  store  in  yards.  It  mainly  depends  on  the 
efficiency of the port and the availability of equipment combined  with the level of occupancy of the storage 
facilities. Transactional dwell time mainly concerns the transaction time between the importers/port services and 
customs. Discretionary storage is the residual after having taken into account operational and transactional dwell 
times.   
11 In an ideal situation, the minimum time for the transactions is 1 day for clearing the cargo depending on whether 
a physical inspection is requ ired. Another 1-2 days for the transfer from the vessel to the yard and a similar 
amount for the transfer from the container yard to the ODCY. Finally it would require half a day/ a day to pay the 
port and shipping fees and exit the port, which means that mean dwell time can not really go, on average, below 3 
days. 10 
 
Table 4:    Comparative Breakdown of Cargo Dwell time Between Durban, Mombasa and Dar-es-Salaam 











1. Time to unload vessel and 
store containers in yard (days) 
1  1  3  3  3  3 
2. Complete clearance 
procedures incl. physical 
inspection (days) 
1  0.5  3  1.5  6  3 
3. Additional/discretionary 
storage 
1  1  1  1  7  7 
4. Arrange land transport and 
complete exit procedures (days) 
1  1  2  2  3  3 
Total average dwell time (days)  4    9    19
12   
3. How Can Low Cargo Dwell Time Be Explained? 
 
In  the  late  1990s,  the  port  of  Durban  was  notorious  for  its  inefficiency  and  high  levels  of 
congestion. It was characterized by long berthing delays for container vessels, long train turnaround 
times in the port and long queues for road trucks and this resulted in dwell times of around 6 – 7 days. 
In 1998, shipping lines lost their patience and introduced a vessel delay surcharge. This was a waking call 
for TPT and TNPA. A committee was created involving the port stakeholders with a defined strategy and 
several measures, which seem to have had the most important impacts, were introduced. These were 
seen  as  drastic  changes  (and  enforcements)  namely  that  of  port  tariffs  as  well  as  Customs 
modernization. 
                                                           
12 Figures reduced in 2010 due to traffic decrease, which made possible decrease of time for steps 1, 3 and 4. 
Moreover, storage and ODCY storage capacity increased, which has also contributed to reduce congestion and 
possibly dwell time (even though dwell time of cargo is usually complex to obtain and sometimes unreliable). 11 
 
A Change in Storage Pricing of the Port Operator 
TPT explained that to achieve their target of 3 days dwell time, one of the more practical and 
simple measures employed was to enforce terms and conditions related to storage of cargo at ports, 
which states that within 72 hours of the discharge of each container from the vessel the Customer or 
the Container Operator shall provide the Terminal Operator with delivery instructions in respect of all 
containers discharged. All containers remaining after the expiration of the 72 hr period shall incur 
storage charges as shown in table 5 below
13. Charges for Durban are almost six times as high as other 
ports in the country. 
Table 5: Storage Fees for Import Containers 
No of Days 
Tariff per Container Type (USD estimate) 
6m/20'   12m/40'
14 
Day 1 - 3  Free Storage Days
15 
Day 4  90  181 
Day 5  237  475 
Day 6  477  954 
Day 7  716  1,432 
Day 8  956  1,911 
Day 9  1,195  2,389 
Day 10  1,435  2,867 
Source: Transnet 
Uncleared cargo or cargo detained by customs for inspection is moved to licensed container 
depots either by the carrier or the terminal operator. The licensed depots generally provide a cheaper 
storage option compared to the terminal charges. It is estimated that about 90% of cargo can and is 
generally cleared within 3 days and only less than 10% of cargo is moved to bonded warehouses where 
the average stay is estimated at around 7 – 8 days with less than 1% of these ending up as long stay or 
abandoned  cargo  (i.e.  28  days  or  more)  which  then  goes  to  a  state  auction.  Free  storage  for 
                                                           
13 It is worth noting that the free time period in most SSA countries is much higher: 11 days in Douala, Cameroon 
or even more in West Africa. 
14 Forty-feet equivalent Unit 
15 The first 3.25 days (78 hours) are free, the free period is applied from 00h01 on the day the vessel completes 
discharge until the container leaves the gate or is loaded for rail or until the 78 hr period is reached. 12 
 
transshipments is 7 days, which probably explains the higher dwell time. However the proportion of 
transshipments at Durban Port is small. 
While the 3 day storage policy released much needed capacity inside the terminal, to address 
congestion around the port area, TPT identified peak periods for collections at 8am – 11am and 2pm – 
4pm which also happen to coincide with the general Durban city commuter traffic peak with a resultant 
conflict between the two creating massive congestion in the city and constraining port access. Cargo 
handling companies and large consignees such as Toyota were targeted and encouraged to collect goods 
at night or during off peak periods.  
Despite all these efforts, it is reported that almost 50% of customers still collect their cargo on 
the last day of free storage. 
Therefore,  major  stakeholders  acknowledge  that  the  introduction  of  the  "punitive  storage 
charge" after day three is probably the most important single event impacting on dwell time at Durban 
port. Even though it took some months for the impact to materialize, DCT saw a continuous drop in 
dwell time and a reduction in the number of import boxes in yard at any given time. 
It is worth noting that this was possible since systems to allow for prompt clearance and release 
were in place. Even though pre arrival clearance has always been possible, it is noted that the length of 
dwell time before the increase in port tariffs was certainly due to the low storage rate, which was at that 
time approximately 10 USD per TEU per day, often cheaper than taking delivery if there was going to be 
commercial storage required. For the storage policy to be effective, it does require the terminal to 
perceive itself as part of a logistical chain and not as a storage facility. Once it has that mindset then 
dwell times will fall assuming there are systems in place to allow for prompt clearance. 
The Role of Public Sector in Improving Efficiency 
Customs 
It would obviously be unacceptable for TPT to impose such a charge to cargo owners when it is 
not possible to clear cargo from customs. Therefore the importance of customs performance in the 
issue of dwell time cannot be over emphasized. 
Studies  show  that  some  of  the  major  delays  at  ports  and  border  crossings  are  because  of 
inefficiencies by the customs agencies. As pointed out by Raven, efficiency of ports or even the timing of 
many of its activities is strongly influenced, if not dictated, by customs (Raven, 2000). The target for 
South Africa’s Revenue Services (SARS) Customs, is to clear within 3 hours for declarations processed 
through Electronic Data Interchange (EDI). According to SARS, during the first quarter of 2011, the 13 
 
average  time  to  release  goods  was  3  hours  when  processed  through  EDI  and  10  hours  when  not 
processed through EDI (with 75% of declarations processed through EDI). 
With  customs  clearing  cargo  in  less  than  1  day  and  TPT  efficiently  moving  cargo  from  the 
terminal area, it is probably safe to assume that there is “no transactional dwell time” at the Port of 
Durban as expressed by one stakeholder (or at least it is rather limited for a Southern or SSA standard). 
Various research notes that customs service, rapidity of processing, simplicity of documentation 
influences port competitiveness. The Customs modernization project made a significant contribution to 
improving the competitiveness of the Port of Durban.  
The project delivery strategy of enhanced compliance recognized three key elements influencing 
customs operations, namely; (i) some taxpayers/traders will always try to comply whether effective 
enforcement exists or not: (ii) the goal is to influence the undecided majority who will choose one way 
or the other based upon how well the strategy is implemented and (iii) some taxpayers/traders will not 
comply whether effective enforcement exists or not – the criminals.
16  
Within that context, the strategy was based on the fundamental principles of making it easy for 
those trying to comply by improving services  and making it hard for those who do not want to comply 
by improving enforcement.  Therefore, measures aimed at increasing treatment differentiation and 
compliances were initiated. In this regard,  contractualization between customs brokers and customs 
was developed. For  instance, for companies wishing to get an authorized economic operator status , 
needed to go through detailed interviews and be transparent  regarding their economic activities and 
supply operations and are, from time to time, controlled randomly. However, these companies 
17benefit 
from a green channel, which means that as soon as the cargo is handled at the port, it can be removed. 
Contrary to most countries in SSA, pre -clearance is then the rule and th is explains why the target for 
customs clearance time is in hours and not in days like in other countries. 
Transnet Role and Infrastructure Investments 
From an infrastructure perspective, South Africa was ill-prepared for the increased trade at the 
time  of  adopting  its  port  liberalization  policy.  The  trade  infrastructure  was  ageing  and  had  been 
neglected for many years; naturally most of the South African ports were under performing. As the size 
of the container vessels calling at South African ports continued to increase, port or terminal congestion 
                                                           
16 Presentation by the Commissioner of SARS, SARS Custom Modernisation: The Modernisation journey; available 
on www.sars.gov.za. 
17 SARS identified its top 20 clients to get accreditation with benefits such as gr een line, fewer inspections, post 
clearance audit etc. These companies account for approximately 70 – 80 % of total cargo. 14 
 
became a critical issue thus increasing the risk of delays. With Durban housing the largest container 
terminal, it was in the spotlight, it quickly gained a reputation of inefficiency and the words congestion 
and  delays were  synonymous  with  the  port  itself. When  the  Minister of  the  Department of Public 
Enterprise finally made an announcement about the infrastructure development cash injection into the 
ports in 2001
18, the shipping lines were encouraged and in no time, the surcharge was dropped.  From 
2002, Transnet invested more than 700 million USD over a five year period focusing on creating capacity 
and equipment. But, this was only the beginning of a long and hard b ut determined transformation 
process by Transnet. 
To date, t he Port of Durban  has seen  the capacity of  its container terminal increase t o 
approximately 3.6 million TEUs per annum with DCT standing at 2.9 million TEUs and the transformation 
of Pier 1 into a high tech facility of 720,000 TEU’s per annum. The investments in the container terminal 
also included 6 cranes in Pier 1 and 19 cranes with twin lifting capability in Pier 2. Further infrastructure 
improvements included widening of the harbor channel entrance to 225 m and a deepening to 19 m at 
the approach. The berthing draft is still below 12 m however it is intended to be deepened to 16.5 m.  
As with most Transnet infrastructure, information and communications technology (ICT) was 
also  a  neglected  area  and  ICT  transformation  was  one  of  the  main  elements  of  the  Transnet 
reengineering strategy. One of the key developments in ICT was the introduction of automated systems 
using  RFID  tagging,  high  definition  cameras,  optical  character  recognition  of  license  plates  and 
information exchange with SARS to replace truck drivers and vehicle checks aimed at reducing the 
length of queues
19. This also includes the move from Cosmos
20 to NAVIS
21 terminal operating system, 
first piloted in Pier 1 at its opening and has been introduced in all ports except Pier 2 over the last year. 
                                                           
18 For a five year period up to 2009, Transnet had made capital investment of up to UD$11.5 billion with 59% spent 
in infrastructure related projects; 32% on rolling stock; 9% on machinery, equipment and a floating aircraft. In 
2009 alone, 43% was spent at Durban. 
19  Changing  the  way  Transnet  works,  Internal  Newsletter,  2010  available  from  the  Transnet  website, 
www.transnet.co.za. 
20 Cosmos offers terminal operators, stevedores, shipping lines and port authorities advanced ICT solutions that 
streamline the logistics of container terminal operations. The applications in the Cosmos suite helps plan, track and 
monitor  all  container  movements  in  the  terminal,  from  arrival  until  departure,  including  booking,  document 
handling and invoicing (http://www.cosmos.be/container_terminal_systems.aspx) 
21 Navis is the technology for managing the movement of cargo through terminals. It provides cargo tracking 
through the port, automated equipment operations, management of multiple terminals through an integrated, 
centralized  solution.  It  integrates  the  industry’s  leading  terminal  operating  system  with  select,  3rd  party 
technologies,  to  offer  complete,  pre-integrated  solutions  that  are  deployed  quickly  and  easy  to  maintain 
(http://www.navis.com/about_us/index.jsp) 15 
 
Pier 2 is currently crossing over from COSMOS to NAVIS. As expected, teething problems are prevalent 
at the port of Durban as a result of the move. 
While  there  are  questions  about  the  return  on  infrastructure  investment,  there  is  general 
acknowledgement  of  the  challenges  brought  about  by  the  new  infrastructure  regarding  human 
resource. A study on the competitiveness of ports in Korea and China identified the role of professionals 
and skilled labor force in port operations, the sophistication level of port information and the scope of 
its applications, as some of the key elements for competitiveness (Gi Tae-Ye et al, 2008).  
With new equipment on board, there was an urgent need to train operators in the use of the 
new equipment. TNPA has committed to enhancing human capital in line with the Transnet group’s 
growth strategy. Training opportunities focusing on marine operations, port engineering and leadership 
development programs are available. In the case of Durban, TPT trained operators to work on the new 
equipment with speed but in a safe way. A training service provider from Singapore was recruited to 
assist in this regard. Some of the techniques they learned include hoisting a container by the crane 
adopting a parabolic profile, which reduces the hoist cycle time by more than 45% thereby boosting 
container  handling  frequency.  TPT’s  performance  highlight  for  2009/2010  includes  improved 
productivity at DCT and Pier 1 with increase of 4.6% and 26.3% moves per Gross Crane Hour (GCH) 
respectively. DCT currently operates at a productivity of 28 moves per GCH, a major improvement from 
the 19 moves per GCH a few years ago (Transnet, 2009). 
Although  Transnet  had  embarked on  numerous  initiatives  to  improve  performance  through 
investment in infrastructure and its human capital, the behavior of third parties remained a challenge. It 
is  reported  that  in  2001,  information  provided  by  shipping  lines  had  an  accuracy  of  43%,  making 
operational  planning  a  headache.  A  strategy  to  alter  behavior  patterns  of  the  private  sector  was 
developed.  
One  of the  key  initiatives  to  achieving  this was  the  introduction of  the  Container  Terminal 
Operation Contract (CTOC) with key customers, mainly shipping lines. CTOC entails establishment of 
service level agreements between TPT and its customers regarding expected performance levels. These 
bind the parties through contract to deliver specified targets such as level of service based on agreed 
performance indicators (i.e. dedicated berthing window, guarantee 28 moves per GCH etc) on the part 
of  the  terminal  operator  and  observing  specific  regulations  on  the  part  of  private  port  users  (i.e. 
compliance  with  specific  requirements  such  as  providing  accurate  information  etc).  Commercial 16 
 
agreements with shipping lines now stipulate a 96% accuracy of information provided
22. Failure to do so 
attracts sanctions. Enforcement of CTOC agreements has been critical for success. 
The interesting thing about the CTOC is that staff can commit to these targets as well and at the 
moment about 5% of TPT staff  have committed to a service level performance of 28 moves per hour. 
Further incentives include a commitment to specific customers to be afforded an agreed level of service, 
be it reduced, during periods of disruption such as labor strikes , etc. while the customer commits to 
clearing cargo from the port within agreed times.  With the bigger customers agreements may even 
involve doing bulk runs at night. 
In an environment where inefficiencies prevail, the private sector feeds from the public sector’s 
inefficiency, therefore creating a virtuous cycle of inefficiency and corruption on both sides. The basic 
issue here is really a need to establish rules of engagement and enforcement on both sides but the onus 
is on Transnet to enforce the rules while fulfilling its mandate of providing an efficient service to its 
customers. And so far, this arrangement seems to be working well. 
TNPA also established port user forums for some of the key  stakeholders, coordinated and 
chaired  by  TNPA  itself.  These  have  been  divided  into  six  clusters  as  follows:  Automotive,  Coal, 
Containers, Iron Ore, Liquid Bulk and Manganese. In the case of the DCT and Pier 1 there is a container 
terminal  advisory  board  which  meets  on  a  monthly  basis.  These  meetings  provide  TNPA  and  its 
customers an opportunity to discuss issues and try to find solutions together. While the process started 
off with both parties playing blame games, the partnership between TNPA and its customers appears to 
be working well as reflected by the recent Barloworld survey of 2010. At least, more than half of those in 
the automotive industry proclaim that logistics capacity of SA’s ports has improved in the last two years 
and  they  also  think  that  the  loading  and  docking  capacity  is  now  competitive  and  comparable  to 
international  practice.  The  Industry  also  gave  customs  a  vote  of  confidence  by  confirming  that 
compliance processes are being dealt with more efficiently than in the past and that corruption has 
decreased, and physical security of goods in the port has improved (Barloworld Logistics, 2010). 
4. Why Was It So Important to Reduce Cargo Dwell Time? 
 
Aggressive  policies  against  long  dwell  times  are  often  pointed  at  by  shippers  as  unfair  and 
disproportionate. The complexity is to set tariffs and measures that are, on the one hand, strict enough 
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to discourage shippers from using the port as a warehouse, and on the other hand, realistic given the 
time necessary to perform clearance formalities and operations.  
In the case of Durban, a target of 3 days has been considered both realistic and necessary to 
achieve  acceptable  operational  performance  and  it  has  been  achieved  through  a  set  of  direct  and 
indirect measures. If one were to evaluate the impact of such dwell time reduction on terminal handling 
capacity and productivity, several factors need to be taken into account: 
-  the physical capacity of the port; and 
-  the usage patterns (dwell time distribution, traffic distribution, etc.) 
Physical capacity is indeed a critical factor in port planning that is directly affected by long dwell 
time patterns (the higher the dwell time the higher the occupancy of the yard). When facing capacity 
shortage issues port planners have however a tendency to immediately consider capacity extension 
projects without envisaging a more optimal use of the existing capacity. 
We argue that dwell time reduction is often a more efficient way to release additional capacity 
in a container terminal at limited cost. But this depends also on usage patterns and more specifically on 
dwell time distribution and occupancy ratios
23. For example we have developed a simple model to 
estimate the impact of dwell time reduction in Durban container terminal given the current usage 
patterns and port capacity.  
Figure 3 shows the dwell time distributions in three scenarios:  
-   short dwell time with an average of 3.3 days (blue curve, actual situation); 
-   medium dwell time with an average of 5 days (red curve); and 
-   long dwell time with an average of 11 days (green curve). 
The impact of dwell time reduction between scenario 3 (green curve) and scenario 2 (red curve) 
is very significant: an estimated 118% additional capacity is released in the container terminal. The later 
reductions between scenario 2 (red curve) and the current situation (blue curve) is also important: 53% 
additional capacity is released. In total, reducing dwell time from scenario 3 to scenario 1 more than 




                                                           
23 Dwell time reduction will have for example a much more sensible impact on a congested terminal for example 
than in a container terminal with spare capacity.  18 
 
 









Source: Local interviews (TPT, MSC and Maersk) and own estimates. 
 
By using a simulation model of operational movements in container yards we show in addition 
that using information about dwell time for the optimal allocation of containers in the container yard 
would lead to additional capacity release of up to 40% in a congested container yard. Containers that 
are expected to be released quickly are indeed best positioned on the top of container piles to avoid 
double-handling. On the contrary the long stay containers should be stored in the lower levels of the 
piles or separately to avoid multiple repositioning before clearance. 
5.  Lessons for Ports in SSA 
 
As articulated in the State of Logistics (SoL) surveys conducted annually by CSIR and others, “the 
performance of the supply chain depends on the quality of the service provided by the private sector, in 





















TPT’s  approach,  in  managing  lower  levels  of  occupancy,    involves  freeing  up  space  and 
improving distribution in the terminal concentrating mainly on the enforcement of the 3 days free 
storage policy and encouraging cargo operators to remove their goods from the terminal as soon as 
possible but within the free storage period. Measures applied include publishing information related to 
arrival times of cargo expiry times for free storage period and sending regular reminders via sms to 
encourage early collection of cargo. TPT also sought close cooperation with its customers targeting the 
large operators, including shipping lines, and transporters, and offering incentives for clearing cargo 
early  by  allocating  preferential  slots  and  stacking  containers  in  a  batch  to  facilitate  the  collection 
process. 
With  most  customers  able  to  complete  customs  clearance  procedures  within  3  days,  the 
majority of port users do comply with the 72 hour policy, otherwise the implications for failure to 
comply are later reflected in the cash books
24, a key issue for the logistics industry regardless of size but 
even more so for the South African industry struggling to recover from the global financial fallout. 
Within this context, the main lesson for the rest of SSA is that: cargo dwell time is a function of 
the characteristics of the private sector BUT the onus is on the public sector (customs, port authority) to 
put pressure on private sector port users to make them more efficient (gradually). In South Africa, due 
to  the  increasing  importance  of  manufacturing/assembling  industry,  which  comp etes  worldwide, 
Transnet is under severe pressure to perform and improve, not only from the private sector but also 
from a government anxious to meet trade policy objectives . Therefore, a virtuous circle is in plac e as 
demonstrated in Figure 4. 
   
                                                           
24 This does not necessarily  mean that prohibitive tariffs has to be replicated in all  ports in SSA  since if not 
implemented, it would only lead to increased corruption and would then undermine the current situation. 20 
 
Figure 4: The Virtuous Circle of Cargo Dwell Time 
 
 
To get a sense of this point, it is important to understand the nature and characteristics of South 
Africa’s private sector as it appears to be the main divergence from most countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. A good place to start is by noting the trading policy of the country which moved from an import 
substitution economy to value added manufacturing export in the late 1990s. This change integrated the 
countries trade into the global market and more than any other country in Sub-Sahara Africa, South 
Africa  has  strongly  diversified  export  characteristics  with  a  significantly  advanced  manufacturing 
industry making it the most competitive regionally. South Africa’s manufactured export goods serve the 
region but largely concentrate on Europe and America. However, from an international trading point of 
view, its geographic remoteness from its key markets places a significant amount of pressure on its 
global competitiveness. 
According to the South African government, the country’s automotive industry is a global, turbo-
charged engine for the manufacture and export of vehicles and components. The sector accounts for 
about 10% of South Africa's manufacturing exports and contributes about 7.5% of the country’s GDP
25. 
Manufacturing in the country is concentrated in the provinces of Gauteng and Kwazulu Natal (KZN). In 
KZN alone, 80% of manufacturers export to Europe with most firms involved in both import and export 
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(Valodia, 2006). For example most of the auto manufacturers import parts that are used to assemble 
vehicles and the finished product is exported back to the key market, in most cases, Europe.  
South Africa is also the largest food exporter in Africa and in 2007 the export value of its goods 
was $ 4.2 billion (UNCTAD 2009) approximately 2% of GDP. Given its disadvantaged location and a few 
other inefficiencies in the manufacturing system, logistics is one of the few key areas were the country 
developed as one of the best in the world
26  therefore improving the country’s competitiveness. 
Another major observation at the Durban Port is that most of the cargo going through the port 
is for the domestic market dominated by large companies as cargo owners but also cargo operators. 
Transit or over border cargo as they call it, account for a very small share of the total cargo traffic. In 
most coastal countries in Africa, these account for a larger proportion of import cargo and most of these 
countries  a  significant  proportion  of  the  transiting  goods  experience  problems  relating  to 
documentation and abandoning of the cargo. Most of the big operators in South Africa also have service 
level agreements with TPT and they prequalify their clients to ensure legitimacy and to avoid taking 
clients with a low or non compliance record. 
In  the  case  of  South  Africa,  any  form  of  delay  at  the  port  is  a  major  irritation  for  the 
manufacturing  industry  but  even  more  importantly  as  expressed  by  someone  in  the  automotive 
industry, they also have huge financial implications for those operating in a competitive environment as 
their businesses have to absorb any cost inefficiencies wherever they occur. 
For most shippers, hours count. The Citrus Growers‘ Association in South Africa estimates that 
delays at the Port of Durban cost its growers US$10.5 million per season (on approximately US$400 
million of exports), based on an average delay per load of 12 hours for each of the 20,000 citrus laden 
trucks that enter the port during peak season (World Bank, 2011). 
It is no surprise that import and export traders have very little tolerance for poor performance 
by a state run freight company, neither does the Department of Trade and Industry which has the 
responsibility of attracting investments into the country. 
In what looks like the key dynamic of the private sector in SA, a Barloworld survey of businesses 
involved in manufacturing and logistics, the industry expresses a sense of ownership to the logistics 
process. While recognizing that public sector is key to this, they feel that the onus is on them to agitate 
and drive the process to see transformation at Transnet (Barloworld Logistics, 2010). The strategy seems 
to have contributed to reducing delays at some of the ports in South Africa. Facing internal pressure 
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from the trade industry and a Trade Ministry eager to establish the country on the world stage, those 
responsible for facilitating trade (Transnet and SARS) had no choice but to transform. 
This presents a marked difference between the private sector in South Africa and that of other 
African  countries  studied.  With  the  exception  of  Kenya,  most  countries  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  are 
characterized by trade dominated by a handful of commodity exports or non time sensitive agricultural 
products and very little value-added production, not even for the domestic market. Therefore, most are 
largely dependent on imports of goods from China and India. Even then, the markets are generally small 
with very little space for more than one large firm as a result, most firms operate monopolies without 
any  competition  and  under  an  extremely  weak  regulatory  environment.  For  most,  as  we  found  in 
Cameroon, inefficiencies in the supply chain can be easily passed on to a captive consumer market while 
profits remain high. However, at the time when trade diversification has become a motto; without a 
more advanced and less rent-seeking private sector, it will be extremely difficult to increase value-added 
and then achieve diversification.  
6.  What Remains to Be Done to Reduce Cargo Dwell Time? 
 
Judging from the reported container dwell time performance, Durban may have successfully 
managed to shed its reputation as a congested and inefficient port. Over the last few years, there has 
been significant progress in improving the efficiency of DCT but challenges remain, particularly with 
regards to labor productivity and port access, all of which have an impact on cargo dwell time. 
Increase Labor Productivity 
Using the number of cranes moves per hour as an indicator, productivity levels at DCT have 
been gradually improving over the years increasing from 17 moves per hour to the current 28. However, 
a recent study commissioned by the Port Regulator suggests that the current levels are not sufficient to 
bring Durban to the performance standards of the world’s best ports. The report shows a comparison of 
Durban with five
27 other ports in different parts of the world and finds that the port falls short in the 
area of productivity, operating at a rate of 23 moves per hour in 2007 while the best port was operating 
at a level of 94 moves per hour (Ports Regulator of South Africa, 2010). But it may well be because some 
of these ports use much more advanced equipment. 
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Given that the port achieves its target of 28 moves per hour, the main issue emerging from the 
interviews is the lack of consistency across shifts. It was reported that some shifts perform better than 
others, meeting the agreed target of 28 moves per hour while others don’t. Possible reasons for this 
inconsistency could be poor supervision or lack of staff motivation. The introduction of performance 
contracts  tied  to  an  incentive  scheme  was  introduced  with  the  aim  of  encouraging  staff  to  meet 
specified targets daily in order to improve the improve the movements of cargo and to keep terminal 
occupancy levels below the specified threshold of 70%. It should also be noted that only 5% of TPT staff 
have committed to that level of performance. It is possible that the performance contracts are not 
yielding the expected results and in that regard there may be a need to review their design and improve 
if necessary. 
Stability of port labor was also mentioned as a key concern for stakeholders as it is perceived to 
have an impact on operations. The high turnover of management staff is listed ias a major cause of 
instability and a desire for this to be reduced was expressed.  
However, the greatest irritation seems to stem from the fact that strikes are widespread in 
South Africa. In 2010, there was a protracted strike over pay and conditions lasting for almost 3 weeks 
starting from 10
th to 28
th May. The strike effectively closed all port operations and the recovery took 
months also evident in the dwell time data presented earlier. 
Improve Port Access 
South Africa’s infrastructure quality is good compared to other SADC countries, and current 
investment in infrastructure will ensure that this position is maintained in future. However, one major 
inadequacy is the lack of intermodal facilities and integration between transport modes, which needs to 
be addressed before South Africa can be seen as a true regional logistics hub (CSIR, 2007). 
The port of Durban has good road connections to the extensive national trunk road network but 
the access roads in its vicinity suffer from congestion. Mainly due to its location inside the  Central 
Business District, port traffic is sometimes in conflict with general traffic particularly during commuter 
traffic peak hours therefore constraining port access and general movement of traffic.  
While  road still  dominates,  rail  transport  plays  a major  role  in  transporting  a  large  bulk of 
commodities, with some dedicated services. However turnaround times are still very high. With regards 
to access, DCT is linked to 4 rail tracks with rail mounted gantries for loading and unloading. In 2008, 
Transnet reported that it handles up to 16 trains per day in and out of the terminal area and this have 
increased to 22 over the last few years (Arup (EThekwini Municipality report), 2008). 24 
 
As previously mentioned, most of the cargo at the port of Durban is either destined for or 
originates from the main economic areas in Gauteng. With the exception of commodities, a lot of 
stuffing and destuffing of containers seems to take place in the Bayhead area
28. Bayhead is served by 
two rail tracks and road access is through Bayhead Road and South Coast Road. Bayhead Road currently 
suffers from congestion mainly from operations located along that road and other city related traffic.  
In addition,  there  are significant   space  constraints  in the Bayhead area  and t he  current 
operation is inefficient and exacerbates the conflict between port and other city economic activities. As 
mentioned earlier, the result of this conflict is restricted access to the port and increased turnaround 
times. 
To alleviate the situation, the Ethekwini report recommended the development of an inland 
logistical  hub,  increasing  capacity  and  improving   rail  turnaround  times  within  the  port   area.  If 
implemented, these improvements will improve port access issues resulting from congestion around the 
port area. 
7.  Conclusions and How to Improve Port Competitiveness 
 
Durban  enjoys  unparalleled  dominance  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  from  a  size  and  performance 
perspective, but TNPA’s aspiration to make Durban globally competitive means the port has to meet the 
standards of other international ports such as the ports of Singapore, Rotterdam and others. 
The main lessons for Sub-Saharan Africa that can be drawn from the Durban port are that cargo 
dwell time is mainly a function of the characteristics of the private sector, but the onus is on public 
sector players such as customs and the port authority to put pressure on private sector port users to 
better  comply  and  reduce  cargo  dwell  time.  Further  cargo  dwell  time  reduction  is  still  possible; 
however, it will be more difficult than what was the case in the early 2000s. 
The level of service has significantly improved in the last decade. However, in order for Durban 
to become a worldwide major port, TNPA still has to overcome a few challenges which are crucial for 
port  competitiveness  from  a  cost  perspective  i.e.  high  port  costs  labor  productivity  and  relatively 
inefficient inland transport networks. Some of the issues of concern are already highlighted by the 
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Shipping and logistics companies and storage areas are located in and around the port area in a haphazard fashion, 
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Regulator’s report on the economic review of South African ports
29. These issues are not just important 
for dwell time. While the port of Durban has seen meaningful improvements over the last few years, the 
challenge to address the above mentioned issues still remains.  
The South African logistical capacity is as good as any developed country in the world; however, 
logistical costs remain high. Cargo dues (berth costs, wharf age) and terminal handling charge, account 
for more than 50% of total port costs in South Africa, a proportion far greater than at any other port in 
the list (see Annex 5). 
The issue of port dues is a major concern in the country, an aspect that is also raised in the 
regulator’s report. According to TNPA, Cargo dues on all commodities, articles, things or containers (full 
or empty) are levied at all ports belonging to or controlled and managed by Transnet. Cargo dues are 
charged to recover the cargo contribution towards port infrastructure (TNPA, 2007). 
It is noted that 70% of the port authorities’ income is derived from port charges and NEDLAC’s 
view  is  that  Transnet’s  port  charges  are  strategic  and  have  characteristics  of  non-port  financial 
objectives. With the LPI showing that more than 50% of SA port users perceive charges to be high/very 
high, clearly Transnet needs to pay attention to the issue in order to attract customers. 
Among other things, the issue of transparency of port charges
30 is an important factor to port 
users (NEDLAC, 2007). Historically, Transnet has been perceived to be lacking in transparency and this 
creates unnecessary suspicion from its customers and the public in general. Given the existing concerns 
about cargo dues, improving transparency  will by no means improve efficiency but it will  change the 
existing perception of foul play and therefore increase stakeholder confidence but also help in attracting 
investors. 
In summary, cargo dwell time is relatively close to international standards in Durban but certain 
issues remain to make Durban fully competitive worldwide, such as reduced cargo dues (in order to 
avoid excessive investments in infrastructure and equipment).  
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30 The NEDLAC report sought to examine administered prices in port services and port operations and it states that 
limited access to information was a major problem for that particular study noting concluding that there is low 
trust and frustration between the players in the port system. It therefore recommends that price and performance 
indicators be collected and made public by the Department of Transport  for the purposes of establishing an 
information basis for monitoring the South African waterfront. This is particularly problematic as there is a general 
sense that Transnet cargo dues are set to target revenues for the holding company. 26 
 
However, labor, energy, tax regulations, etc. may be of even more importance for a firm to be 
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Export Trading Routes: South Africa
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Annex 2: Total Port Traffic – Eastern and Southern Africa (Metric Tons 000) 
Country   2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
South Africa  173 555  179 984  183 353  185 079  182 735 
Kenya  12 978  14 101  15 536  15 996  18 957 
Mozambique  6 321  6505  6571  7426  7 994 
Namibia  3 131  3 603  4 236  4 690  No data 
Tanzania  5 572  6 020  6 690  6 732  7 353 
 
 
Annex 3: Aerial View of the Port of Durban
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Annex 4: Container Terminal Facilities  
Berth Data 
Entrance draft  Area  Berth (m)  Draft (m)  Length (m) 
16.4 
  100  8.2  276 
  101  11.6  229 
  102  11.7  213 
  103  11.9  235 
DCT  104  11.6  351 
  105  11.9  235 
  106  11.5  213 
  107  11.7  238 
Cross berth 
108  11.6  273 
109  11.8  272 
  201  11.9  216 
  202  12.3  216 
New Pier 1  203  11.8  305 
  204  11.5  305 
  205  11.7  305 
 
   32 
 
Annex 5: Structure for evaluating container port competitiveness in Korea and China 
 
Source: Gi-Tae Yeo et al, 2008 
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Annex 6:  Total port and handling costs per TEU (USD) 
 
Source: NEDLAC, 2007 
 